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THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT*
David J. Danelski**
The Japanese Supreme Court, which was created in 1947, has developed
slowly and gradually as a political institution and only recently its impact has
been obvious.: It is now clear that in many areas of political life the Court has
exercised power, which is another way of saying that it has had political impact.
Every discussion of impact is also a discussion of power; hence a useful way of
conducting impact analysis is to use power concepts. That is the approach taken
in this article.
I. Toward Conceptual Clarity
A court or a judge acts, and as a result of that action, others act. This is
an impact relation, and the language of power is useful in understanding it "Any
power relation," writes Frey, "minimally involves four components: an influencer
(R), an influencee (E), the influential behavior of the influencer (a), and the
... response of the influencee (f8). Moreover, the relation occurs in some sped-
fied setting or context."' Thus Frey defines a power relation as: R --> E, in
a given setting, X. Put somewhat differently, R exercises power (or has impact)
in regard to E when a is an independent variable and 8 is a dependent variable
in the same relation. The setting or context must be taken into account to deter-
mine (a) the meaning of a and ,8 not only in relation to each other but also in
relation to other activity of which each is a part, (b) the extent to which a
(though independent in regard to t) is dependent on other variables, and (c)
the extent to which f6 is dependent on variables other than a.
The four components in a typical Japanese Supreme Court impact relation-
ship are defined as follows:
1) Influencer (R). The influencer in the typical impact relationship con-
sidered in this paper is, of course, the Supreme Court; but the Court is under-
stood in a broad sense to include individuals (for example, the chief justice, jus-
tices, and the secretary general) and groups (for example, judicial conferences
and the Court's personnel section) whose behavior influences others because of
their perceived association with the Court.
2) Influencee (E). An influencee is any person, group, or institution whose
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Simon Guggenheim Foundation in 1968-69 when much of the data for this paper was collected
in Japan. I should also like to express my appreciation to good friends both in Japan and in
the United States whose help was indispensable in writing this paper. They are Jill Parmer
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behavior results from, or is altered by, the Supreme Court (R). The influencees
focused upon in this article will be narrowed in the discussion of the scope of
impact in the next section.
3) Influential behavior (a). The typical influential behaviors of the Su-
preme Court are its decisions in cases and matters concerning the judiciary gener-
ally. Among such behaviors are opinions (majority, dissenting and supple-
mentary), speeches, statements to the press, nominations of persons for judge-
ships, recommendations of judges for retention and promotion, requests and
demands to other governmental officials, transfer of judges, and demotion of
judges.
4) Influenced behavior (,8). Among influenced behaviors are compliance,
praise, criticism, defiance, judicial appointments, and promotions. Influenced
behavior, like the other components in the typical impact relation, is viewed
broadly. It also includes press coverage and expression of perceptions of the
Court and attitudes toward it.
The language of power is useful not only in specifying the components of
impact; it is also useful in structuring impact analysis by providing the concepts
of scope, domain, and weight. Scope refers to the values affected by the Court's
influence. Domain refers to the persons, groups, or institutions influenced.
Weight refers to the extent to which influenced behavior is dependent on Court
behavior.'
II. Scope
The scope of the Court's impact is potentially great, for its impact may be
moral, economic, or political. It is dear that at least some of the justices wanted
the Court's decision holding D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Louer obscene
to have moral impact, for the majority opinion stated that "the Court is invested
with the duty of protecting society from moral degeneration."' And the Court's
decisions extending the right to strike in labor disputes appear to have had eco-
nomic impact. The scope value for moral impact is rectitude; for economic
impact it is wealth; and for political impact it is power. The definition of politi-
cal power is useful in understanding political impact. Frey defines it as
power over the allocation and distribution of power. Political power is
power over power, as distinguished from power over the allocation of goods
and services, education, prestige, and other values. The more a particular
power relation affects other power relations, the more political it is.5
3 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan defined these concepts as follows:
"The weight of power is the degree of participation in the making of decisions; its
scope consists of the values whose shaping and enjoyment are controlled; the domain
of power consists of the persons over whom power is exercised. All three enter into
the notion of 'amount' of powers." D. LASSVWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY:
A FRAMEWORK FOR PoLrrCAL INQUIRY 77 (1950).
4 General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, Judgment upon the Case of Translation
and publication of LADY CHATTERLEY'S LovER and Article 175 of the Penal Code at 7 (1958) ;
11 S~ixo SAiBANsHO HANREEsHU 997 (1952); COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 3 (J.
Maid ed. 1964).
5 Frey, supra note 2, at 5.
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The Supreme Court's political impact, 'then, is manifested in relations in which
influencees have power, and the Court's influential behavior in some way en-
hances, diminishes, or reallocates that power.
Although political impact may be analytically differentiated without diffi-
culty from other kinds of impact, existentially the various types of impact overlap
and intermingle. For example, a Supreme Court decision declaring a book
obscene may have moral impact; but it has political impact, too, for it enhances
the power of the police to raid bookstores, the power of procurators to prosecute
booksellers, and the power of judges to punish them. In a decision that upholds
the rights of workers to strike without the imposition of criminal sanctions, the
Court's impact is political as well as economic, a fact that is well understood by
labor unions.6
Since the subject of this article is political impact, its focus is the Court's
relations with institutions that exercise power. There are many such institutions,
but only those for which there is available data will be considered. They are the
Emperor, the Diet, the Cabinet, the judiciary, the media, and the electorate.
The power exercised by the Diet, Cabinet, and judiciary over individuals and
groups is obvious and needs no comment; but the power of the other institutions
requires at least brief comment.
Some might argue that today the Emperor has so little power that he should
not be considered in this discussion. A survey conducted in Tokyo in 1969, which
is presented in detail later in this article, showed that perceptions of the Emperor
were mixed. A 42-year-old businessman said the Emperor is an obstacle to prog-
ress. "Because such a person exists, evil people will use him. The Emperor's
history has been a history of having been used by evil people." Others said the
Emperor is useless. He is, said a 49-year-old rice store owner, "like a navel in
a belly-we cannot do anything with him." For some, mention of the Emperor
evoked memories of the war. "I do not respect him much," said a 51-year-old
man. "I am not interested in him at all. I dedicated myself to him but I did not
get my reward. Most of my friends died in the war. I am very sorry for them.
Why did he force us to go to war and kill my friends?" What power the Emperor
has is based largely on symbolism, and that symbolism was deliberately used
after 1946 to enhance the prestige and power of the Supreme Court and its
members. Only two government officers receive their appointments from the
Emperor-the prime minister and the chief justice. This was written into the
Constitution of 1946 to demonstrate the importance of the chief justice's office
and the Supreme Court. When the chief justice and justices were installed in
office in 1947, each was "presented personally to the Emperor and Empress and
received from them both admonitions and certain indicia of office."' The act
symbolized the passing of some power under the new Constitution.
The media-particularly the press--have power to shape public perceptions
6 Soon after the Supreme Court ruled that public workers might strike without incurring
criminal penalties, the Japan Times reported: "The General Council of Trade Unions of
Japan (Sohyo) Wednesday praised the Supreme Court for criticizing the police and prosecutors
for excessively intervening in the labor movement." Japan Times Oct. 27, 1966.
7 T. Blakemore, Memorandum for the Record: Conversation with Justice Hasegawa,
August 6, 1947. (Record Group 331, SOAP Archives.)
[Vol. 49: 955]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER[
and attitudes in regard to individuals, institutions, and issues. Often the press
is an intermediary link in influence chains, and how it presents the Supreme
Court's behavior to the public often determines the weight of the Court's impact.
The electorate's power in Japan is exercised not only in voting governments
in and out of office; it may also indicate its dissatisfaction with the Supreme
Court and even vote justices out of office in periodic referenda called people's
review. After each chief justice and justice is appointed to the Supreme Court,
and every ten years thereafter, he is reviewed by the electorate to determine
whether he should remain on the Court. Thus far no member of the Court has
been removed by this procedure, but in 1972 the percentage of negative votes
reached an all-time high of 13 percent with seven justices on the ballot.8 One
justice's negative vote was more than 15 percent and six prefectures (including




The Supreme Court's impact on the Emperor has been negligible. One of
the first cases before the Court concerned the Emperor. Matsutaro Matsushima,
a former Chuo University law student, had been convicted of the crime of Use-
majeste for carrying a placard criticizing the Emperor at a Communist demon-
stration in front of the Imperial Palace. Since amnesty had been declared in
such cases, the Tokyo High Court ordered dismissal of the indictment (menso).
Believing the effect of the High Court's action left him still convicted of U se-
majesti, Matsushima, seeking an acquittal (muzai), appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Court rejected his appeal, but two justices-Shimoyama and Sawada
-indicated in a dictum that they thought the crime of 1Use-majesti had not been
completely abolished in Japan. To the contrary, Justice Shono argued that when
the Emperor's status had been changed with Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam
Declaration, the crime of 1Use-majestj had been completely abolished." Today
slander of the Emperor may be punished as ordinary defamation, but the prime
minister must make the complaint. No complaint was made against Fukasawa
when his novel, Furyu Yume Monogatari (The Tale of an Elegant Dream),
describing the beheading of the Emperor and his family, was published in 1960.
This stirred the ire of right-wing groups, and in 1961 a young extremist murdered
the maid and wounded the wife of the novel's publisher.",
8 The percentage of negative votes in people's review has been correlated with the number
of justices on the ballot-the lower the number of justices, the higher the percentage of negative
votes. In 1967, the last time seven justices were on the ballot, the percentage of negative votes
was 7.5. See D. Danelski, The People and the Court in Japan, THE FRONTIERS O17 JUDICIAL
RESEARCIr 58-59 (J. Grossman & J. Tanenhaus eds., 1969).
9 Ishimura, Seikosai Saibankan Kokumin Shimsa no Kekka to Tokushoku (The Results
of People's Review of Supreme Court Justices and Its Peculiarities), GENDAI Ho JANARu 58-68
(Feb. 1973).
10 2 SAIXO SAIBANSHO HANREISHU 529 (1948).
11 Ito, The Rule of Law: Constitutional Development, LAw IN JAPAN 225 (A. von Mehren
ed. 1963).
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About the time the Court decided the Placard case (May 1948) Chief
Justice Mibuchi participated in a round-table conference on the Emperor's re-
sponsibility for the war, and he was reported as saying that the Emperor should
abdicate. When this statement was published in the Shukan Asahi, Mibuchi
claimed he had been misquoted or misinterpreted. "At the time," he told re-
porters later, "I said I thought it would have had a better effect on the morality
of the people in general if the Emperor at the time of surrender had issued an
Imperial Rescript morally blaming his own self." The effect of Mibuchi's state-




During the first two years of its existence, the Supreme Court faced a Diet
challenge to judicial independence. The Judiciary Committee of the House of
Councillors began an investigation of a criminal case decided by a district court
in which the defendant had been convicted of killing her three children and
given a light sentence. On May 20, 1949, acting Chief Justice Tsukazaki wrote
to the Speaker of the House of Councillors stating that the Committee's action
was "absolutely unpardonable from the standpoint of the Constitution." "The
Constitution is the supreme law of the State," he added, "and it is needless to
say that the Diet should respect it." Tsukazaki's final words in behalf of the
Supreme Court were: "We hereby ask you to reflect seriously on the matter.""lT
The Judiciary Committee did not capitulate and made counter-constitutional
arguments, but eventually the matter was settled in the Court's favor.
In the years that followed the Supreme Court viewed its power of judicial
review with caution and exercised it with restraint. It managed to avoid passing
on the constitutionality of important statutes and treaties by invoking the doctrine
of political questions and by refusing to decide cases unless they involved concrete
legal disputes." The most important example of judicial restraint was the Court's
decision in the Sunakawa case in which it held that the constitutionality of the
United States-Japan Security Treaty was a political question it could not
answer." Some have argued that the Court's early timidity in exercising judicial
review was necessary because the Court was still in the process of legitimation.
Others argued that restraint was appropriate because the rule of law is better
realized through the political process rather than the judicial process. Chief
Justice Tanaka, who served on the Court from 1950 to 1960, felt that even
though the Court had not exercised judicial review in an important case during
his tenure, "the very power of judicial review would have a psychological effect
12 Japan Times, May 29, 1948; K. TSURUMI, SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE INDIVIDUAL:
JAPAN BEFORE AND AFTER DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II 186 (1970).
13 N. Tsukazaki to T. Matsudaira, May 20, 1949. (Record Group 331, SCAP Archives.)
14 See D. Henderson, Japanese Judicial Review of Legislation: The First Twenty Years
and K. Yokota, Political Questions and Judicial Review: A Comparison, THE CONSTITUTION
OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY YEARS 126-138 '(D. Henderson ed. 1968).
15 See Id., at 146-166.
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in persuading the legislature to respect the Constitution," a conclusion many
scholars found dubious.16
The Court has exercised judicial review only four times-in 1953, 1960,
1962, and 1973. The first case involved Cabinet Order 325, which had been
issued during the Occupation, and two transitional statutes covering the period
immediately preceding the 1952 peace treaty. At the time the Court declared
the statutes unconstitutional, they were no longer in effect." The statute declared
unconstitutional in 1960 was likewise not in effect when it was struck down."
In 1962 the Court held unconstitutional Article 118 (1) of the Customs
Law in Nakamura v. Japan.9 Nakamura and others attempted to smuggle from
Japan to Korea a large quantity of textiles belonging to a third party. They were
caught, and under Article 118 (1) the textiles were confiscated. On appeal the
owner of the textiles argued that the property had been confiscated unconstitu-
tionally because the procedure used under Article 118 (1) did not provide notice
and hearing as required by the Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed,
declared Article 118 (1) to be in violation of Articles 29 and 31 of the Constitu-
tion and, as required by law, notified the Cabinet of its action. As a result of the
Court's decision, new rules governing confiscation of third parties' property were
established in 1963; and those rules require notice and hearing before confisca-
tion.2"
Although the Nakamura decision was a clear exercise of judicial review, it
was not regarded as important. The Asahi Shimbun devoted only 35 lines to it,
and in 1973, when the Court declared Article 200 of the Penal Law unconstitu-
tional in the Parricide cases, some newspapers reported that as the Court's first
exercise of judicial review.2 Certainly it was the first important exercise of
judicial review in regard to a statute still in effect.
The defendants in the Parricide cases were women. One killed her father
who had forced her to have sexual relations with him when she was 14. After 20
years of intimate relations with him and five children by him, she decided to
leave him and marry a man she met at her place of employment. When her father
objected, she strangled him in his sleep. The second woman strangled her foster
father to death because she could not stand his excessive drinking. The third
woman, perturbed by her mother-in-law's incessant criticism, attempted to kill
her by serving her poison in some rice balls. The women were charged with
violating Article 200 of the Penal Code, which makes mandatory more severe
penalties in parricide cases. In one of the cases the trial court declared the statute
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, by a vote of 14 to 1, overruled a 1950
decision in which two justices-Mano and Hozumi-had dissented and held that
Article 200 violated Section 14 of the Constitution, which provides that all
persons are equal under the law.
16 Ito, supra note 11, at 238.
17 See supra note 14, at 128-133.
18 See Ito, supra note 11, at 238.
19 See supra note 14, at 133-138.
20 Kagawa, Tekihotetsuzuki to Daisansha Shoyubutsu no Bosshu (Due Process and Con-
fiscation of Goods Belonging to Third Parties), JuRIusuo (Standard Judicial Precedents:
Series No. 1, Constitutional Precedents) 92-93 (Special Issue 1966).
21 Asahi Shimnbun, Nov. 28, 1962; Japan Times, April 5, 1973.
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Reaction to the decision was generally favorable. Professor Takeyoshi
Kawashima of Tokyo University praised the decision saying that Article 200
reflected old feudal notions. Professors Seiichi Isono of Tokyo Educational Uni-
versity and Jiro Kamijima of Rikkyo University also praised the decision. The
latter said it shows the Supreme Court is following the principles of the Constitu-
tion. Dr. Inada Nada, the physician-novelist, said that "even the judges who are
always behind the times" this time could not help seeing the contradiction in the
parricide statute. Justice Mano, now retired and in his mid-80s, said that the
decision points to the "true flow of history." His former conservative colleague,
Yusuke Saito, was annoyed with the decision. He said that it seemed to him that
14 justices had lost their qualifications for the Supreme Court. "The new
decision," he added with some exaggeration, "is ruining the whole penal system
of the country." There was also some popular criticism. The writer, Ayako Sono,
said that the penalties for parricide should be more severe because there is greater
regret in such crimes and so the heavier penalty allows for special atonement.
The popular entertainer Sanyutei said with all the talk about fundamental human
rights and equality, social life has become abnormal. "The existence of the special
penalty for parricide is a reasonable thing."22
Justice Minister Isaji Tanaka told a Diet committee in answer to a question
by a Komeito member that he would "respect" the Parricide decision. Daizo
Yokoi, director of the trial section of the Supreme Public Procurator's office, said
that sentences in 36 parricide cases now before the courts would be determined by
the penalty provisions for regular crimes. In addition, he said the sentences in
previous parricide convictions would be reviewed because of the Supreme Court
decision.23
Some newspapers saw the Parricide decision as a sign of the Court's willing-
ness to act vigorously in defense of the Constitution. The Asahi Shimbun pointed
out that since 1966 the Court had been moving in this direction as evidenced by
its decisions granting public workers the right to strike and by insisting that
persons accused of crimes be given prompt trials.2 The observation may be ac-
curate and indicate a willingness of the Court to be more activist. A recently
retired justice who participated in the decision of the Parricide cases told a group
of students at the Harvard Law School that he had hoped there would be at least
one case in which the Court would exercise judicial review before he retired, and
he got his wish.
A similar sequence of activity led to the exercise of judicial review in the
Parricide and Nakamura cases:
1) Each involved constitutional issues that had been decided earlier by
a divided Court.
2) The earlier decisions had been criticized by scholars.
3) Lawyers continued to raise constitutional objections to statutes up-
held earlier, and sometimes lower court judges declared the statutes
unconstitutional.
22 Mainichi Shimbun, April 4, 1973; Japan Times, April 5, 1973.
23 Id.
24 Asahi Shimbun, April 4, 1973.
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4) The issues continued to return to the Court, and chances of over-
ruling the statutes became better because of changes in personnel on
the Court and a different climate of constitutional opinion.
This suggests that sometimes dissenting opinions-such as Mano's and Hozumi's
in the 1950 Parricide case-have impact, particularly in the scholarly and
judicial communities.25 Mano, for example, believed that the dissenting opinions
in the 1950 Parricide case may have influenced the drafters of the proposed
Revised Penal Code to delete Article 200 in 1961.6 The work of scholars like
Professor Shigemitsu Dando is read with respect, and his belief that Article 118
(1) of the Customs Law was constitutionally suspect probably played some role
in the Court's decision in the Nakamura case 7 Whether the sequence described
indicates a pattern is something that will not be known until the Court exercises
judicial review in a number of cases.
The exercise of judicial review in the Parricide cases is a reminder to mem-
bers of the Diet that they must follow the Constitution or run the risk of being
reversed by the courts. But judicial review is not the only means of Supreme
Court impact on the Diet. Court interpretations of statutes and ordinances have
been known to influence the legislative process in the Diet.2" What influence the
Court has with the Impeachment Committee of the Diet is not known, but Chief
Justices Tanaka and Ishida easily survived attempts to impeach them.
C. The Cabinet
The Supreme Court has influenced the Cabinet chiefly in the area of judicial
appointments. The Court plays a crucial role in the appointment of lower-court
judges because the Constitution requires the Cabinet to appoint judges from a
list of persons nominated by the Court, and the practice has been for the
Supreme Court to nominate the exact number of judges for the available posi-
tions, thus leaving no choice to the Cabinet.29 Constitutionally, the power to
select Supreme Court justices is entirely the Cabinet's, but Court members,
especially the chief justice, have influenced the selection of their own colleagues.
During the Ashida administration-circa 1949-Chief Justice Mibuchi asked
that he be consulted when appointments to the Court were made. The reason
for his request was to assure that the Cabinet selected persons who were com-
patible with other members of the Court. The request was granted, and the
practice of consulting the chief justice on appointments to the Court has con-
25 See, e.g., H. WADA, SAIKO SAIBANSHO RON (The Supreme Court) at 11 (1971).
26 T. Mano, Saikosai no JuiAhinen: Hanketso no Omoide (Eleven Years on the Supreme
Court: Some Memories of Decisions) SAIBAN TO GENDAi (Trial and Modem Age) 16-17
(T. Mano ed. 1964).
27 Kagawa, supra note 20, at 93. Cf. S. DANDO, JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 475 (B.
George, trans. 1965).
28 An example is the Supreme Court's decision in the Tokyo Ordinances case. Beer notes
that some believed that the decision played a part in establishing the controversial 1958 Police
Duties Bill that failed to come to a vote in the Diet. L. Beer, The Public Welfare Standard
and Freedom of Expression in Japan, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTY
YEAss at 235 (Henderson ed. 1968).
29 Stevens, The Miyamoto Case: A Legal Analysis 12, 1972 (unpublished paper).
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tinued. Consultation is informal. The chief justice and the prime minister often
meet at ceremonial functions--for example, at an Imperial garden party or in
the waiting room of the Diet just before its opening ceremony. The views ex-
pressed by the chief justice are his own, not the Court's, because as a former chief
justice said, "[i]t would be a grave matter if the Court's opinion were rejected."
The last consultation for a chief justice concerns the choice of his successor. How
frequently the advice of the various chief justices was followed by the prime
ministers will probably never be known, but one former chief justice told me
that his advice was almost invariably followed.30
In the early 1950s there was some feeling in the Court that a person selected
by the Cabinet for the Supreme Court was too young. Because others in the
judiciary who had graduated from the university the same year were still in much
lower positions, some judges and judicial administrators believed that his appoint-
ment was highly premature. As a result, two justices called on the justice minister
in an effort to persuade him that the appointment should be withdrawn. They
were unsuccessful."' Recently, however, Liberal-Democratic governments have
been unsuccessful in countering the Court in the selection process. Both Sato and
Tanaka wanted to appoint Minoru Tsuda, a justice ministry official, to the Court,
the former in 1971 and the latter in 1973; but Chief Justice Ishida was able to
prevail with his candidates in both instances. In 1971 Seiichi Kishi, secretary gen-
eral of the Court and "Ishida's right arm," was appointed. In 1973 Yutaka
Yoshida, Kishi's successor as secretary general, was appointed. And when Ishida
retired from the chief justiceship in 1973, he supported his colleague, Tomokazu
Murakami, as his successor, and Murakami was named chief justice 3
Some decisions of the Supreme Court have impact on the policies of the
government and its ministries. In 1969, for example, when the Court decided
public workers could strike without incurring criminal penalties, Prime Minister
Sato directed that the government's coordinated position on the ruling be
put in writing, and ministers immediately began a review of policies in relation to
the decision. 3 Another example is the Court's 1971 decision that held the
Ministry of Transport's procedure for screening applicants for owner-driver taxi
licenses was illegal. Soon after the decision, a spokesman for the Ministry said
that the policy in question had changed and no similar trouble would arise in the
future 4
D. The Judiciary
The Supreme Court has had a substantial impact on the judiciary. The
main reason for its influence over lower-court judges is that it plays a crucial role
in their nomination, assignment, and promotion; but it would be a mistake to
30 Confidential interviews, May 22, 1969; June 26, 1969.
31 Confidential interviews, March 10, 1969; June 26, 1969.
32 Asahi Shimbun, May 16, 1973; Japan Times, May 19, 1973.
33 Japan Times, Oct. 29, 1966.
34 Nakagawa, Konin Taxi Jigyo no Menkyo Shinsei: no Shinsa to Koseitetsuzuki (Appli-
cation for Owner-Driver Licenses and Fair Procedure), 24 Hoso Jrno 199 (1971); Japan
Times, Oct. 29, 1971.
(Vol. 49: 955]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
generalize about Supreme Court influence over the entire 25 years of its existence
because the makeup of the lower-judiciary has changed considerably during that
period.
The typical judge from the late 1940s to the early 1960s cautiously decided
cases with expectations of his superiors in mind. If he believed the Supreme
Court would decide a case a certain way, he would feel constrained to decide it
that way, and he was aware that his seniors tended to be conservative and that
their views on him might well be reflected in his dossier in the personnel section
of the Supreme Court. During most of this period Kotaro Tanaka, a conserva-
tive and a militant anti-communist, was chief justice; and he frequently gave his
views at judicial conferences and to the press. He is often quoted as having said
that communists should not be treated by the courts as law-abiding citizens but
as criminals by conviction. Some judges were undoubtedly influenced by such
statements. During this period, however, some judges were atypical. One
of them, Tokyo District Judge Akio Date, declared the United States-Japanese
Security Treaty unconstitutional in the Sunakawa case and thereafter resigned his
judgeship. In his writings he urged judges to be more independent, to think for
themselves, and to decide cases according to their best judgment without worry-
ing about the Supreme Court. It has been said that he resigned because the
Supreme Court reversed his decision in the Sunakawa case. When I asked him
about this in 1969, he denied it, saying he had made up his mind to leave the
bench before he decided the case. He had been a Supreme Court research
official (chosakan) before he returned to the Tokyo District Court, and hence he
knew the Chief Justice and justices fairly well. Because of that, he believed that
they would know that he had been sincere in his decision; hence he was not
concerned about their criticism of him. He was, however, surprised that when the
Court announced its decision not a single justice agreed with him. If Date did
not resign because of a Supreme Court decision, at least one judge during
this period did. He was Eigoro Aoki, who resigned in 1962 in protest of the
Supreme Court's decision in the Yakai case that year. 5
By the middle 1960s a generation gap had developed in the judiciary. Older
judges tended to be conservative and younger judges progressive; a few younger
judges perhaps even saw themselves as radical. The more radical students at the
Legal Training and Research Institute during this period almost invariably chose
to become lawyers, refusing to become a part of the conservative establishment
by becoming judges or procurators. Thus there were few if any radical judges,
but to their older colleagues, some of the young judges seemed radical. As con-
firmation, the older judges pointed to the fact that many young judges (about
200) belonged to the Young Jurists Association (Seinen Horitsuka Kyokai, gen-
erally known in abbreviated form as Seihokyo), which has been described by
some as a group of anti-government, leftist lawyers and judges. In 1968 and
35 YAKAS JUHACHINENSrI SHICHI TO MUzAI NO TANIMA (Eighteen Years of the Yakai
Case: in the Valley Between Death and Innocence) 118-119. (Yakai Case Committee ed.
1969.)
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1969 I talked to a number of judges in Japan about the developing generation
gap, and the major portion of a meeting I had with judges of the Sapporo
District and High Courts was devoted to it. Several judges under 40 spoke openly
about differences of attitude between younger and older judges. The senior
judges present said nothing but asked to talk to me privately later. At that
meeting they expressed their concern about the developing polarization in the
judiciary. They did not see themselves, they said, as conservatives. Judging to
them was not ideological; rather it was something requiring technical skill and
experience. By the fall of 1969 the tensions between the two groups of judges
erupted in a series of incidents, the first of which occurred in Sapporo.
On August 14, 1969, Kenta Hiraga, Chief Judge of the Sapporo District
Court, wrote a private letter of "advice" to District Judge Shigeo Fukushima, a
39-year-old Kyoto graduate, giving his views on the merits of a controversial
case that Fukushima had before him in which 173 local citizens sought to enjoin
the building of a missile base of the Self-Defense Forces on the ground that this
action violated Article 9 of the Constitution. Fukushima ignored Hiraga's ad-
vice, granted the injunction, and Fukushirna's friends gave a copy of Hiraga's
letter to reporters. Thereupon the judicial conference of Hiraga's own court
disciplined him for his action, and less than a week later Chief Justice Ishida
convened a judicial conference of the Supreme Court which also disciplined
Hiraga and transferred him to the Tokyo High Court. Soon thereafter, Chief
Judge Shigeto limori of the Kagoshima District Court, the younger brother of
Kotaro Tanaka and an ultra-rightist, came to Hiraga's defense contending that
the whole incident had been engineered by judges who were members of the "sub-
versive" Young Jurists Association. For this he was reprimanded by the Fukuoka
High Court. In late October Chief Justice Ishida, troubled by the matter and
probably with Fukushima in mind, told an assembly of Kanto area judges that in
a case involving the propriety or impropriety of the exercise of governmental
power, "it is desirable that each judge avoid falling into self-righteousness.... I
hope I can expect that you will mutually exchange acquired experience and knowl-
edge in a spirit of modesty." The Court's secretary general, Seiichi Kishi, said on
April 8, 1970: "If judges join groups that are vested with political color this will
give rise to public doubts as to the probity of the courts; judges should not join
[such] groups." Less than a month later Chief Justice Ishida told reporters at a
press conference on the eve of Constitution Day, May 2: "As a matter of ethics, it
is undesirable that ultranationalists, militarists, and clearly not communists,
should be judges." Proceedings were brought against Fukushima, Hiraga, and
Ishida in the Diet's Impeachment Committee. It ruled that proceedings could be
brought against Fukushima but suspended them during his good behavior. The
petitions against Ishida and Hiraga were rejected. On October 28, the Sapporo
High Court, apparently influenced by the Impeachment Committee's action,
orally reprimanded Fukushima for permitting Hiraga's letter to become public.
The next day, the Supreme Court announced it supported the High Court's
action. Fukushima resigned the same day, criticizing the High Court for being
subservient to political power. On the following day he had a change of heart
and asked if he might withdraw his resignation. His request was granted. He
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was reprimanded again for his critical remarks, he formally apologized, and he
resumed his work on the bench. 6
In April, 1970, the Supreme Court refused to nominate three graduates of
the Legal Training and Research Institute as assistant judges. No reason was
given for its action, but two of the three were known to be members of the Young
Jurists Association."'
On December 22, 1970, Chief Judge Iimori sent a letter to his young col-
leagues in Kagoshima District Court, asking them if they were members of the
Young Jurists Association. Upon being summoned to the Fukuoka High Court
for discipline he withdrew his questionnaire. Immediately the Supreme Court
also acted. On December 25 it transferred Iimori to the Tokyo High Court.
When he refused to come to Tokyo, he was demoted to the position of regular
judge in his court. As a result of the Court's tough action, he resigned.3"
In April, 1971, the Supreme Court refused to nominate seven judicial
trainees at the Legal Training and Research Institute for posts as assistant judges.
The secretary general of the Supreme Court insisted there had been no discrimi-
nation, but six of the persons rejected were members of the Young Jurists Associ-
ation, and one was a sympathizer. When the president of the Japan Federated
Bar Association, Kijuro Watabe, criticized the Court for its failure to nominate
the seven Institute trainees, the Court's secretary general, Yoshida, wrote an
angry rebuttal, saying Watabe "threatened to damage the independence of the
judiciary." The Federated Bar, the latter continued, should act with restraint
and stop interfering in matters that were entirely in the province of the Court.39
During the graduation ceremony at the Legal Training and Research Insti-
tute on April 5, 1971, one of the graduating students, Tokuo Sakaguchi, grabbed
the microphone from Director Tadashi Morita and started to protest what he
thought was discriminatory action of the Supreme Court in denying judicial
nomination to seven of his fellow students and pleaded that the seven be given a
chance to speak. The ceremony ended at that point, and Sakaguchi was dismissed
from the Institute by the Supreme Court the same day. Despite considerable
political pressure directed toward the Court to reverse itself, it refused to do so.
Graduation ceremonies were held a few days later, but the press was barred. A
Court public relations officer later quoted Chief Justice Ishida as telling the grad-
uating students: "I wish all of you to act with confidence and pride but try not
to be too over-confident or self-conceited."'
In January, 1971, the chief judges and senior judges from four high courts
and 36 district and family courts throughout Japan met for six hours at the
Supreme Court to discuss the propriety of judges' membership in Seihokyo.
36 This brief account of the Hiraga-Fukushima incident is based on Hayakawa, The
Japanese Judiciary in the Whirlwind of Politics, KOBE L. REv. 15-18 (International Edition
No. 7, 1971); Ushiomi, Hiraga Shokan to limori Shoshin (The Hiraga Letter and the Iimori
Statement) 489 Horitsu Jiho 64 (1969); F. Miller, The Naganuma Case: judge Fukushima
and the Seihokyo, 1972 (unpublished paper). Fukushima later held the Self-Defense Forces
unconstitutional. See Mainichi Shimbun. Sept. 7, 1973; New York Times, Sept. 8, 1973.
37 Japan Times, April 1, 1971.
38 Hayakawa, supra note 36, at 18.
39 Japan Times, April 1, 9, 1971.
40 Japan Times, April 7, 1971; May 9, 1971.
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"According to the secretariat of the Supreme Court," the Japar Times reported
on January 23, "it was unanimously agreed at the meeting to hold that member-
ship in the association was undesirable from the standpoint of fairness and the
neutral stand that judges have to maintain." About this time, a controversy about
Assistant Judge Yasuaki Miyamoto of the Kumamoto District Court was just
getting under way. Like Fukushima, he was a member of the Young Jurists
Association but, unlike Fukushima, he was just completing ten years in the judi-
ciary, which meant his record would be reviewed by the Supreme Court and a
decision would be made whether to reappoint him. The decision was negative,
and the Supreme Court did not explain its action even though several persons and
groups sought an explanation. On April 7 and April 9 two assistant judges who
were also up for reappointment-Etsuru Suzuki, 37, and Keikichi Hirasawa,
35-resigned in protest.4" On April 15, Miyamoto went to Tokyo and asked the
director of the personnel bureau of the Supreme Court, Koichi Yaguchi, why he
had not not been reappointed; but Yaguchi would not tell him. All the Supreme
Court would say about the matter was that Miyamoto was not rejected because
he was a member of the Young Jurists Association. Its official position in 1971 was
that it did not discriminate against members of the Young Jurists Association.
When Yaguchi was asked by a Socialist Diet member during a House Audit
Committee hearing whether the Court discriminated on the basis of sex or
ideology in nominating judges, he answered it did not. "We never use anyone's
ideology as criteria for adoption or reappointment of judges," he said, "and we
will not do so in the future. And we have never checked on whether a judge is
a member of Seihokyo, nor have we ever discriminated against a judge because
of that affiliation." Despite a campaign by scholars, lawyers, and judges who
argued that the Court was violating judicial independence and freedom of con-
science, the Court held fast in its decision not to reappoint Miyamoto or to tell
why it would not do so. Miyamoto also held an appointment as summary court
judge and served in Kumamoto in that capacity until March of 1973 when he
resigned. He said the had remained in that post so that he could better manifest
his resistance to the Supreme Court. Miyamoto told reporters that he would
continue as a citizen fighting for reinstatement.42
When the Supreme Court was faced with the decision to reappoint judges in
March, 1972, there was a report that five of the 62 judges being reviewed were
in limbo. All were members of the Young Jurists Association. One of them was
Toshio Konno, an assistant judge in the Nagoya District Court. When he had
served in the district courts of Nagano and Gifu he had ruled 11 times that
a provision of the Road Traffic Law was unconstitutional because it required any-
one who was responsible for a traffic accident to report it to the police. In 1970,
he was arrested for speeding in Nagano Prefecture and failed to identify him-
self as a judge, saying he was a businessman. He did this, he said, because if he
had identified himself correctly he might not have been fined. When he learned
that there were problems in Tokyo concerning his application for reappointment,
41 Hayakawa, suprz note 36, at 19-23.
42 Stevens, supra note 29; Japan Times, April 2. 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 24, 1971; May 3,
5, 7, 24, 1971; July 3, 17, 1971; Jan. 23, 1971; March 15, 1973.
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he withdrew it. He told reporters that he did not have confidence in his work as
a judge; obviously he did not think about legal matters like the Supreme Court
justices did; so perhaps he should not be a judge. The Court recommended
reappointment of the remaining 61 judges, including the four members of the
Young Jurists Association.43
The Supreme Court's impact on the lower judiciary in the past few years
has been great. Its confrontation with the Young Jurists Association and its sup-
porters appears to have enhanced its power over the judiciary because (1) it has
driven some independent-minded judges from the bench, (2) it has brought
would-be recalcitrants into line, (3) it has indicated that membership in the
Young Jurists Association is suspect, and as a result membership in the Associa-
tion has declined among judges, (4) it has shown that it will act against the right
as well as the left if its authority is challenged, (5) it has discouraged persons with
strong ideological views from choosing the judiciary as a career, and (6) it has
shown that as long as it has the support of the government, as clearly shown in the
incidents described above, it cannot be successfully challenged by bar associations
and other groups.
In exercising power over lower courts, the Supreme Court is constantly creat-
ing the judiciary in its own image or, more accurately, in the image of the Court's
secretariat, which has been controlled from the beginning by bureaucratic career
judges like Ishida, Kishi, and Yoshida. Although the generation gap led to a
crisis in the Japanese judiciary in the past few years, Ushiomi predicted that the
Supreme Court would have prevailed anyway because of the bureaucratic nature
of judicial life in Japan. As today's young, fresh, independent-minded judges
grow older, he wrote, they will turn out much like their seniors because they lead
isolated lives, they must "breathe old bureaucratic air" while they wait many
years for promotion to important posts, and little by little they conform until they
too fit the Supreme Court secretariat's bureaucratic mold."
Perhaps Ushiomi is correct, but it is too early to tell. This much is clear: the
Supreme Court has had great impact on the judiciary and quite likely will con-
tinue to have such impact for the indefinite future.
E. The Media
Newspapers have been the most influential medium portraying the Supreme
Court to the Japanese people. A content analysis of the Asahi Shimbun from
1947 through 1968 shows that news coverage of the Supreme Court fluctuated
from year to year, depending largely on the importance of cases before the Court.
The most extensive coverage of the Court was in 1959 and 1960 when there were
40 front-page stories concerning the Court each year. Much of the coverage con-
cerned the Matsukawa and Sunakawa cases that had been decided late in 1959.
In an effort to determine whether news coverage of the Court increased or
decreased in the period studied, news stories on the appointments of justices were
analyzed separately. The analysis showed that coverage of appointments remainea
43 Asahi Shimbun, March 7, 1972; Japan Times, March 3. 7, 9, 1972.
44 T. UsHIoMI, HORrTSUKA '(Jurists) 137 (1970).
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about the same throughout the 1947-1968 period. Significant exceptions were
appointments of chief justices, which, after the appointment of the initial chief
justice, received from five to twenty times as much coverage as other appoint-
ments. This is not surprising, for hierarchy is important in Japan; and the chief
justice is not only at the top of the judicial hierarchy but is the only judicial
officer in Japan who is officially appointed by the Emperor. Moreover, as admin-
istrative head of the Court, he has considerable formal and informal power in
administering the judiciary and in exercising influence in such matters as ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court.
Table I
Editorials on the Supreme Court






An analysis -of the Asahi's editorials concerning the Court shows that they
too fluctuated from year to year, but there were just as many editorials in the
first half as in the second half of the period analyzed. As Table I shows, there
was a trend in the Asah's praise and criticism of the Court. Although the Court
fared much better in the second period, it still received more editorial criticism
than praise. Nonetheless, criticism is a sign that the Court and its decisions are
regarded as important, and an average of six editorials a year for some 21 years
is an indication that the Court has been taken seriously.
The Asahi Shimbun did more than report on cases, appointments, and
people's review. It published articles by such scholars as Kenzo Takayanagi and
Toshiyoshi Miyazawa on the Court's authority to interpret the Constitution.
Immediately after important cases were decided, often there were articles or
comments by leading scholars and sometimes former Supreme Court justices
about the decisions. In addition to educating their readers, the Asahi and other
newspapers that follow this practice participate in the legitimation of the Court's
decisions or lay a foundation for contrary decisions in the future.
Two celebrated cases--the Matsukawa and Yakai cases--did more to make
the general public aware of the Supreme Court than perhaps anything else.4
The litigation in these cases almost spans the history of the Supreme Court. Each
case was before the Court more than once, and each was finally decided in favor
of the defendants. Organizations were formed for the defense in both cases;
they held demonstrations, marches, and produced a flow of propaganda designed
to influence public opinion and the judiciary.
The Matsukawa case was a criminal prosecution of 20 defendants for
45 See C. Johnson, CoNsPnAcY AT MATSUKAWA (1972).
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murder of three persons killed in a 1949 train derailment that many believed had
been inspired by communists. It was in the courts almost a decade before it
reached the Supreme Court, but long before that the Court, through Chief
Justice Tanaka, was involved in the case. In May, 1955, he sent an official in-
struction to lower-court judges calling the Matsukawa movement "indeed regret-
table" (makotoni ikan de aru) and told them "not to listen to the noise of public
opinion" (seken no zatsuon ni mimi o, kasu na)." Bitterly criticized by the left for
the statement, he refused to back down.
When the case came to the Supreme Court in 1958, the Court allotted ten
days for oral argument, an unprecedented action that was reported with banner
headlines in Japanese newspapers; and for the entire period the case was before
the Court, press coverage was extensive. Other media also presented the Matsu-
kawa case to the public-a play, at least five movies, and a number of Matsukawa
songs. The play was shown in Tokyo while the Supreme Court was considering
the case in 1959. Critics thought it was too ideological to be good theatre, and
a television network concluded that it was too one-sided to show, but nonetheless
it publicized the case. The most important movie was made two years after the
Supreme Court remanded the case to the Sendai High Court for retrial. The
movie was entitled The Matsukawa Case and its makers claimed that 3.7 million
persons had seen it within 90 days of its release. The film used documentary tech-
niques and received some comment in movie magazines. It may not have been
a critical success-Chalmers Johnson says "the film's dramatic credibility was
compromised by its ideological slant"-but there is no doubt that it helped make
the Japanese population aware of the Matsukawa case and, indirectly, of the
Supreme Court.4"
The Yakai case was also a criminal prosecution, but it did not have the polit-
ical overtones of the Matsukawa case. In 1951 one Yoshioka brutally murdered
a farmer and his wife while they were sleeping. He confessed, but the police
did not believe he had committed the murder himself, and as a result of coercive
questioning he named five others as his accomplices. One of the men named
was released, but the other four were tried and convicted of the crime. The
matter was not resolved until 1968 when the Supreme Court, hearing the case
for the third time, exonerated the four persons named by Yoshioka. For some 17
years it periodically dominated the news concerning the Supreme Court. There
were several books written about the case, the most important being Saibankan
(The Judges), which was written by Hiroshi Masaki, the chief lawyer in the
case, and published in Kobunsha's popular Kappa Books series. It was a best
seller. Masaki's book was the basis of a feature-length film on the case. When
the filmmaker, Tadashi Imai, asked to see the Yakai defendants, procurators
asked the Supreme Court to prohibit him from doing so. The Court denied the
request and asked the film company to postpone filming until the case was finally
decided. The Court also requested changes in the story and it was changed five
times. Finally Kakiwa Gokijo, who was then secretary general of the Court and
later became a Supreme Court justice, asked the film company not to make
46 Id. at 258.
47 Id., at 227, 285, 326-327.
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the film because it would interfere with the judicial process. Imal decided to go
ahead anyway with the movie which he called Mahiru no Ankoku (Darkness
at Noon), but Toei, the film distribution company, at first refused to book it,
"having allegedly received threats from high government sources. Eventually
Imai and Toei got together and the director abandoned independent production
for the security of a Toei contract." Two critics' analysis of the film was that
Imai had "sacrificed technique in the heat of argument and was not above using
tear-jerking of the most unabashed haha-mono variety to win the sympathy of
his characters." Nonetheless the film has been shown widely and won a number
of awards. There are few adults in Japan who have not heard of the Yakai
case.
48
Films calling attention to the Supreme Court are unusual. Newspapers are
the main source of information about the Court and its work, and recently it
has received extensive coverage concerning the Court's power over the lower
judiciary and its power of judicial review, which was dramatically illustrated in
1973 in the Parricide cases. If the Court does not have high visibility in Japanese
society, it is not because it has been ignored by the media.49
F. The Electorate
To determine the Supreme Court's impact on the electorate, a survey was
conducted under my direction in Tokyo in 1969.50 A sample of 100 adults who
lived in a ward near Tokyo University was interviewed to ascertain (1) their
perceptions of the Court, (2) their attitudes toward it, (3) their knowledge of it,
and (4) their behavior in people's review (the periodic referenda on retention
of Court members). Each of the respondents was aware of the Supreme Court
and was able to answer most of the questions. A few refused to answer questions
on their voting behavior in people's review.
The respondents were asked how they perceived the Supreme Court, and
were given six descriptions from which to choose. Some chose more than one,
48 ANDERSON & RicHE, THE JAPANESE FILM: ART AND INDUSTRY 284 (1949). Roughly
translated, haha mono means the woes of a long-suffering mother.
49 This section has dealt primarily with the media's presentation of the Court because
perceptions of the Court and its actions are important behaviors in impact relations. Occasion-
ally the Court seeks to influence the press directly or use it to influence others. In April, 1971,
the Shukan Asahi and the Asahi Shimbun published reports of secret meetings of the Supreme
Court in which it discussed Judge Miyamoto and made its decision not to reappoint him. The
Court's secretary general, Yoshida, claimed the reports were groundless and demanded a
retraction and an apology. At first, an Asahi editor maintained the reports were accurate and
the Court had no right to brand them as fabrications, but a few days later the Asahi Shimbun
made a retraction and apology, which the Court accepted. Japan Times, April 24, 29, 1971. An
illustration of the Court using the press to influence others occurred in November, 1971. An
investigator for the Public Security Investigation Agency asked a young female judge to
divulge the contents of a recent judges' meeting in Nagoya. The investigator and the judge
were graduates of the same university, and he approached her several times in an effort to get
the information. She reported the matter to her superiors who notified the Supreme Court.
The Court issued a press release which stated that such an attempt by the government to learn
of judicial matters was "regrettable." Japan Times, Nov. 20, 1971.
50 Mr. Kahei Rokomoto, a graduate student at Tokyo University who is now on its faculty,
drew the sample for a study he was conducting on the settlement of civil disputes. It is a
random sample of adults living in Bunkyo-ku who had been involved in civil disputes (prin-
cipally growing out of auto accidents and landlord-tenant conflicts) at any time during a
nine-year period. I wrote the questionnaire in consultation with him. He translated it into
Japanese and conducted the interviews. I am deeply indebted to him for his fine work.
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and a few volunteered descriptions of'their own. The six descriptions and the
number of choices for each were:
The highest court in Japan 54
An institution that protects human rights 41
An institution that interprets the Constitution 19
An institution that maintains the status quo 8
A progressive or left-wing institution 2
A conservative institution 1
A clear finding indicated by these responses is that the Supreme Court in 1969
was viewed neutrally or functionally but not ideologically. Here are some per-
ceptions that were volunteered:
"It's an institution up in the clouds."
"The distance between the people and the Court is great."
"It's an institution that considers matters carefully."
"It protects us."
"It gives us justice."
"It is progressive; recently more people have been found not guilty."
"It changes its attitude according to the political situation."







Some explained their responses. Here are some illustrative comments:
Very favorable: "It is not disturbed by politics."
Favorable: "In reading the newspapers I began to have a favorable feeling
toward the Supreme Court. For example, I like the decision in the
Teacher's Union case. The Liberal-Democratic Party was not satisfied
with the result I learned, but I think the decision shows the neutrality
of the Court."
"To a reasonable extent, I trust the Supreme Court."
"I have a favorable feeling about the Supreme Court because of its
decisions in cases like Matsukawa."
"From time to time, the Court gave decisions that did not agree with
the ideas of the Liberal-Democratic Party."
Neutral: "I'm not interested in the Supreme Court. I have never taken
a case to it. But it has power."
"The Supreme Court seems very distant."
"There is no direct line between me and the Supreme Court."
"Since I get information from TV, I don't know much about the Su-
preme Court."
"I do not read carefully the newspapers."
"I do not like to decide matters with law. It is better to solve matters
with talk."
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"I put all my interest in business; so I am not interested in other
matters."
Unfavorable: "I am not for the Supreme Court recently because of its
recent decisions. The Supreme Court is not the guardian of the Con-
stitution, but has become the guardian of power."
"My suit was rejected by the Supreme Court. I had hoped the Court
would study my case more closely."
"It seems the Supreme Court is a scary place."
"I am dissatisfied with the defendants in the Matsukawa case receiving
compensation."
"It looks authoritarian."
"At present, the Supreme Court is a left-wing minded institution. Look
at the decisions."
The comments suggest that the Court is regarded favorably or unfavorably be-
cause of its decisions. Some of the references are general, but the Matsukawa
case was mentioned three times and the Teacher's Union case once. Those who
have an unfavorable attitude to the Court are not ideologically the same. Some
dislike the Court because of its conservative decisions while others dislike it be-
cause of its progressive decisions. The comments of persons who neither like nor
dislike the Court are consistently neutral. By and large, they are simply un-
interested."-
Table II
Party Affiliation and Attitudes toward the Supreme Court
Liberal- Social Komei Socialist Communist Other or
Democrat Democrat None
*N=48 *N-6 *N=4 *N=24 *N--10 *N=11
Favorable 42 33 25 25 30 30
Neutral 48 67 50 25 30 54
Unfavorable 10 0 25 50 40 16
TOTALS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
*Respondents who indicated that they voted for more than one party were counted
more than once; hence the total N is more than 100.
Table III







51 Attitudes toward the Court are related to perceptions of it. Those who view the Court
favorably tend to perceive it principally as a protector of human rights, while those who view
it unfavorably or neutrally tend to perceive it as the highest Court in Japan. In general, the
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Age and Attitudes toward the Supreme Court
19-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 Over 60
N-17 N=23 N=30 N=17 N=10
Favorable 18 43 40 29 30
Neutral 41 52 47 47 60
Unfavorable 41 5 13 24 10
TOTALS 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Attitudes were also related to party affiliation and demographic character-
istics, as Tables II through V show. Not surprisingly, 90 percent of persons
voting for the Liberal-Democratic Party had either favorable or neutral attitudes
toward the Court, and almost half of those voting for Socialist and Communist
Parties had unfavorable attitudes. This confirms the correlation previously found
between party affiliation and voting in people's review.2 Women were inclined
to be more neutral than men, and only a few of them indicated an unfavorable
attitude toward the Court. Persons coming from rural backgrounds were more
inclined to have unfavorable attitudes toward the Court than those from urban
backgrounds. This was somewhat surprising because in people's review rural pre-
fectures generally support the Court more than urban prefectures. Of course,
practically all of the respondents had lived in Tokyo for many years. Perhaps
persons who come to Tokyo from rural communities develop attitudes over time
that are different from attitudes of persons who have lived only in rural commu-
nities or urban communities. Different generations have different attitudes
toward the Court. Persons under 30 are most inclined to have an unfavorable
attitude; persons from 30 through 50 have the most favorable attitude; and
those over 50 fall in between these two age groups.
Even though the Supreme Court had not exercised judicial review in an
important case by 1969, 53 percent of persons in the sample indicated that they
knew the Court had this power; 32 percent said that the Court did not have
this power; and 15 percent said they did not know. Knowledge of the Court's
52 D. Danelski, supra note 8, at 60; Ishimura, supra note 9, at 64.
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power of judicial review was related to attitudes toward it. Among those holding
a favorable attitude, 70 percent knew the Court had the power to declare laws
of the Diet unconstitutional, compared With 42 percent of those whose attitude
was neutral and 50 percent of those whose attitude was unfavorable.
The questions about voting behavior in people's review elicited a number of
voluntary comments that the procedure was "meaningless," "useless," "unreason-
able," and "foolish," and the majority of comments indicated that the respon-
dents did not know much about it or the justices when they voted. About 95
percent of the respondents who voted in regular elections said they also cast
judicial ballots. Fewer than 10 percent of them indicated that they had cast
negative votes. When they were asked what was the source of information about
the justices, almost half of them said they consulted no source. Others indicated
newspapers, other news media, and the official biographies of the justices as the
principal sources of their information. One man said that the Communist Party
was his source of information, and he voted as directed by the party. Of those
who cast negative votes, only one person could remember the name of a justice
against whom he had cast his vote. It was the communist just mentioned, and
he said he had voted against Chief Justice Tanaka. The only other mention of
a justice's name was also Tanaka's. One respondent said Tanaka was his friend.
In 1958 Tanaka, realistically appraising people's review, said that it
is very doubtful whether a great majority of the people who voted knew-
not only anything of the judgments rendered by the individual judge, or
his views as expressed therein-but anything even of his character, intellect,
or career.
He went on to say that it is conceivable that the "votes for dismissal were cast
chiefly on instructions issued by leaders of labor unions to their members, by
some elements of the left-wing parties and in particular by the communists."
Nevertheless, he concluded that it is "undeniable that the system has been instru-
mental in linking the people psychologically with the Supreme Court, and has
thus emphasized the latter's importance." 3 Perhaps Tanaka is correct, but the
survey discussed here does not confirm his conclusion. Yet the respondents had
fairly clear images of the Court and attitudes toward it. It may be that those
images and attitudes were due, at least in part, to people's review.
IV. Weight
The weight of the Supreme Court's impact depends on the extent to which
(1) its behavior a is uninfluenced by others and (2) its behavior a contributes
to the behavior f8 of others. Thus the impact relation having the greatest weight
is:
S.Ct. a -> B,8
Although such relations occur, they are not typical. Typically the Court reacts
to the actions of others. For example, in the Sunakawa case, it reacted to the ap-
53 D. Danelski, supra note 8, at 57.
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peals and arguments of the government, which was seeking to influence the
Supreme Court to reverse Judge Date's ruling of unconstitutionality of the
Security Treaty. And typically the Court's behavior influences others who in turn
influence still others and so on until the Court's behavior is effective. Thus even a
simplified typical impact relation looks more like this:
Aa-> fiS.Ct. a->f8X->,fYa-->fZ
Such a relation is an influence chain, and impact in the chain is consecutive. In
more complicated chains, impact may be also sequential; that is, the Court ap-
pears two or more times in an impact relation. The Matsukawa and Yakai cases,
which came before the Court more than once, are examples. The recent Parrti-
cide decision is even a better example. The issue was initially decided in 1950
over the dissents of Justices Mano and Hozumi, which contributed to the criti-
cism of the majority decision by scholars, which together encouraged some trial
judges to declare Article 200 of the Penal Code unconstitutional, all of which
contributed to the Supreme Court declaring Article 200 unconstitutional in
1973, which contributed to behavior of the justice minister, procurators, and
judges that finally resulted in the reduction of sentences of convicted persons and
an end of more severe sentences in parricide cases in the future.
A difficult problem facing the impact analyst is ascertaining the extent to
which the Supreme Court contributes to the occurrence of an event at the end
of an influence chain. Although difficult, the problem is in principle solvable.
What is needed is extensive, high-quality data to determine patterns in influence
chains, and given certain specified conditions, the probability and extent of the
Court's behavior a contributing to the behavior 86 of others. Statistical methods
for such analysis are presently available.
Some things are already known about the nature of impact relations. For
example, when the Court nominates judges for appointment by the Cabinet, the
relation is ordinarily simple; and the probability of the Supreme Court a con-
tributing to Cabinet 8 is very high. Another class of relations in which the
Court's impact has considerable weight is Court behavior directed toward a
member of the judiciary. The cases of Miyamoto, Konno, and Iimori are dramat-
ic illustrations. But when the Court makes decisions that are contrary to govern-
ment policy, it is difficult to predict the pattern and weight of impact. It would,
of course, turn on the issue decided. The Parricide cases are one thing; the
Sunakawa case another. Important in such cases are contextual considerations-
the climate of opinion concerning the Court among the elite and people at a
given time, the likelihood of persons having political power acting in support of
the Court's decision, and similar considerations.
Perhaps the most important question in regard to the weight of impact con-
cerns the Court's ability to influence the behavior of others. In other words, why
does S.Ct.a-->Efl occur? This is perhaps the most important question in the study
of judicial impact in Japan or any other country. In my work on the impact of
American courts, I have suggested four hypotheses as possible answers and shall
use them in attempting to explain the weight of judicial impact in Japan.5
54 D. DANELSKI, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (forthcoming).
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1) Judges can exercise power because of popular beliefs that they do exer-
ise it and should exercise it. Belief systems result from socialization and vary
from culture to culture. The judicial symbolism of the West, rooted in religion,
does not apply to Japan. Before the Occupation judges were to a large extent
viewed as bureaucrats, and like other bureaucrats they were perceived as powerful
and as being entitled to deference. After the present Constitution went into
effect, judges gradually acquired a new image. They formally acquired indepen-
dence, and one of their main functions was believed to be the protection of human
rights.
Table VI
Popular Perceptions of Judges, Procurators,
Lawyers, Professors, and Politicians in the Tokyo Area, 1971*
Friend of Trustworthy Intelligent Good Feeling
Justice About Them
Judges 57.0% 71.9% 85.9% 17.1%
Procurators 39.5 51.0 78.4 11.3
Lawyers 38.9 62.2 81.9 20.2
Professors 19.6 52.2 85.3 28.7
Politicians 8.4 10.5 38.1 6.5
*The figures in this table are percentages of respondents who said they
agreed or strongly agreed with the descriptions indicated.
Source: NIHON BUNKA KAIGI, NIHON JIN NO HOISHIKI
(Japanese Legal Consciousness) 186-189 (1973).
A 1971 survey conducted by researchers at Tokyo University shows that
Japanese judges are favorably perceived.55 Table VI reports the sum of per-
centages of respondents indicating agreement and strong agreement with the in-
dicated perceptions of judges, lawyers, procurators, professors, and politicians.
The descriptions "friend of justice" and "trustworthy" are the most important
for judges. It is a tribute to the Japanese legal system that judges and procurators
head the list as friends of justice, and it is remarkable that judges lead procurators
by more than 17 percent. Judges again head the list as trustworthy with almost
72 percent agreement. And in intelligence they head the list with professors.
Judges do not lead, however, in being persons who are perceived as giving others
a good feeling. They rank third under professors and lawyers and above proc-
urators and politicians. This is not surprising. In the 1969 survey previously
described some respondents volunteered perceptions of the Supreme Court as
being a scary place. Courts and judges were also regarded as being distant-in
clouds, a group with which a typical citizen had no direct connection. It should
be noted that politicians in the 1971 survey consistently received the lowest per-
centages across the board. This may be significant for the impact of the Supreme
Court in clashes with the Diet or with the Cabinet.
55 NIrON BUNYA KAiGI, NIHON JIN NO HOxSMKI (Japanese Legal Consciousness) 186-189
(1973). The survey was conducted in the Tokyo area. The sample was random and consisted of
1053 respondents, who were interviewed.
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In the 1969 survey respondents were asked to rank the following: Emperor,
prime minister, chief justice, cabinet minister, Supreme Court justice, governor
of Tokyo, dean of law faculty at Tokyo University, and president of the Japan
Bar Association. Some of the respondents felt they could not rank the Emperor
and others facing the same problem solved it by ranking him zero. For the most
part the remaining respondents ranked him as either 1 or 8. In order to check
the relationship of the rank order that emerged, four former justices were also
asked to rank the same offices. Table VII reports the survey rank order based
on average scores and next to it are the rank orders of the former justices.
Table VII
Rank Order of Official Positions, 1969
Survey respondents' Former justices' rankings
average rankings
A B C D
Emperor 2.260 1 1 (can't (can't
rank) rank)
Prime Minister 2.275 2 2 1 1.5
Chief Justice 2.868 3 3 2 1.5
Cabinet Minister 4.231 4 4 3.5 3.5
Supreme Court Justice 4.516 5 5 3.5 3.5
Governor of Tokyo 5.033 6 8 5 7
Dean of Tokyo U.
Law Faculty 6.100 8 6 7 6
President of Japan
Bar Association 6.193 7 7 6 5
When the Constitution was written in 1946, an effort was made to put the chief
justice on the same level as the prime minister and the justices on the same level
as cabinet ministers. Former Justice D apparently took this into account in his
ranking. He said that the prime minister and the chief justice must be ranked
at the same level because they have the Emperor's personal investiture (shinnin-
kan), and the cabinet minister and justice must be ranked at the same level
because they are prime minister appointees through the Emperor's attestation
(ninsho-kan.). The popular rank order puts the chief justice a little below the
prime minister and the justices a little below cabinet ministers, as two of the four
former justices do; hence the hopes of the Constitution's framers appear to be
substantially fulfilled.
In the Court's early years it exercised considerable restraint in declaring
statutes unconstitutional or otherwise making decisions that would be inconsistent
with government policies. It did, however, ultimately free the defendants in
the Matsukawa and Yakai cases, but in view of the years of litigation involved
and no clear signal from the government to do otherwise, these were not neces-
sarily important exercises of power. The Court's decisions in the Tokyo Teacher's
Union case in 1966, the Government Worker's Union case in 1969, and the
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Parricide cases in 1973 were clear exercises of power that were not consistent
with government policy. Such exercises of power contributed to the image of a
powerful institution. In a sense, by exercising such power the Court pulled itself
up by its bootstraps.
2) Judges are able to exercise power because they possess power indepen-
dently of their offices. In regard to the Japanese Supreme Court, the hypothesis
seems to be true, for the Court is the top rung of a number of career ladders.
There is a practice, which is sometimes honored in the breach, of appointing
five justices from the career judiciary, five from the bar, and five men of learning
and experience (professors, procurators, and diplomats). Although top lawyers
and professors in recent years have had to be persuaded to accept appointment
to the Court, appointees to the Court are generally men of distinction and power
in their own professions. To some extent they bring that with them when they
come to the bench. In regard to the career judiciary, there is little doubt that
powerful judges rise to the Supreme Court, and the route is fairly clear. One of
the important-and powerful--offices on the way up is the secretary generalship
of the Court. Graduates from Tokyo University have been overrepresented in
the Court, but that is an indication of power in a double sense: first the Tokyo
graduate who has done well enough to gain admission to the University and
become a lawyer, judge, procurator, or professor is marked for the elite if he or
she is not already a junior member of it; and, second, the Tokyo University
cliques (gakubastu) have wielded power in the judiciary for generations. The
fact that judges come to the Supreme Court late in their careers-about the age
of 60-and the fact that retirement is mandatory at 70 means that there is a
constant influx of persons having power bases outside the Court. The five-five-
five rule was not instituted in the interest of maintaining the Court's power, but
that appears to be one of its consequences.
3) Judges are able to exercise power because they are perceived to be
experts. In the United States there is some evidence that legal compliance is
related to popular perception of legal expertise of judges." There are few societies
in which expertise is as important as it is in Japan. For career judges, there is
solid educational and experiential foundation for expertise-a university educa-
tion, graduation from the Legal Research and Training Institute, years of appren-
ticeship on the bench, and perhaps further formal training (sometimes abroad).
Even then, a judge is usually only an expert in a given area of the law, for
example, civil law, criminal law, or administrative law. Professors also come to
the Court as specialists. In this regard lawyers are sometimes handicapped, and
this sometimes affects their power within the Court. Overall, however, the Su-
preme Court is perceived as a body of legal experts, and because of that per-
ception, their interpretations of law and decisions are more readily accepted.
4) Judges are able to exercise power because they are perceived as being
independent. A judge does not personally exercise power if he does the bidding
of the cabinet, political party, or boss. In those instances power is exercised but
it is not judicial power except in a formal sense. In pre-war Japan judges were
56 R. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE 14-15, 132-133 (1967).
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under the supervision of the justice ministry. Today the Constitution provides
for judicial independence. Lower-court judges are answerable to the Supreme
Court, but constitutionally, except for impeachment, the chief justices and justices
are answerable only to the people periodically at elections. In the 1969 survey
it will be recalled that some respondents indicated they had favorable attitudes
toward the Court because it had decided some cases contrary to the Liberal-
Democratic Party's policy positions. In other words, they supported the Court
because it appeared to act independently. Furthermore, many respondents saw
the Court as the protector of human rights. To fulfill this function, it has to be
independent of the Diet and Cabinet for those are the likely sources of violations
of human rights. This is another way of stating Montesquieu's notion of sepa-
ration of powers. Its purpose was to protect individual liberty, which in Japan
would be understood today as human rights. In the Fukushima and Miyamoto
incidents the Court was charged with violating judicial independence and free-
dom of conscience and with carrying out the will of the government. Such
charges raise questions about the Court's independence, and if it is perceived as
doing the government's bidding or being unfaithful to the principle of judicial
independence, one of its important power bases is undercut.
V. Conclusion
If one wants to know whether an institution is important, the question to
ask is: Does it have impact? And for a political institution, the most significant
impact is political. The scope of the Japanese Supreme Court's impact includes
power; hence it has political impact. The domain of its impact reaches impor-
tant Japanese political institutions, but the weight of that impact varies. The
Court's impact has been greater on the judiciary than on the Cabinet and greater
on the Cabinet than on the Diet. Although difficult to measure, there has been
judicial impact on the press and the electorate. Perhaps as important as the
Court's impact thus far has been its popular support, which has developed grad-
ually. In 1947 the Supreme Court came into being largely because the Occu-
pation authorities insisted upon it, and so it was written into the MacArthur
Constitution. Its history has been like the history of that Constitution. It was
accepted politely but not altogether willingly, marked for revision after the
Occupation, tolerated, Japanized little by little, and finally established as part of
Japanese life. Indeed, the Court is coming to political maturity more quickly
than many expected, even more quickly than did its American counterpart after
which it was modeled. In its maturity much is expected of it, no less, in the words
of a recent editorial, than giving "real life to the Constitution."5 No Court can
fully meet that expectation, but the Japanese Supreme Court has a better chance
of at least some success than most constitutional courts.
57 Japan Times, May 3, 1973.
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